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The starting point of this paper is an argument to the conclusion that
the definition of metaphysical possibility in terms of correct conceivability,
conceivability informed by knowledge of relevant essences, found in Rosen
(2006) is equivalent to a version of the essentialist definition of metaphysical
necessity. This argument appears to show that correct conceivability is a
notion of conceivability by name only and is therefore of no interest to epis-
temologists of modality. In this paper, I present the equivalence argument,
explain the idealizing assumptions involved in it and sketch a version of the
conceivability approach which weakens these assumptions in order to show
that the notion of correct conceivability can still play a specific limited role
in the epistemology of modality.
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1 The Conceivability Approach in the Epistemology of Modality
It seems clear that we can have knowledge of certain objective, non-epistemic possibilities.
The empty sheet of paper on my desk could for example have been filled by notes which
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I could have taken earlier today. Perhaps the same can be said about certain objective,
non-epistemic necessities: It seems that we know that same sheet of paper could not
have turned out to be an abstract object. We could call at least the first and perhaps
also the second of these two modal sentences a Moorean modal truth, a modal truth
about which it would be absurd to say that we do not know it.1 It is however much less
clear how we manage to acquire knowledge of such modal truths. This is the central
question of the epistemology of modality.
A traditional approach to the epistemology of modality which one finds both in
Descartes and Hume, is the conceivability approach. Hume for example writes that:
‘Tis an established maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives
includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is ab-
solutely impossible.’ (Hume and Beauchamp (2000), p. 26.) Similarly, Descartes asserts
that: ‘It must be noted that possible existence is contained in the concept or idea of ev-
erything that we clearly and distinctly understand[. . . ].’ (First set of replies, Cottingham
et al. (1991), p. 83.)
The conceivability approach remains one of the main approaches to the epistemology
of modality.2 It can be broken down into two central theses: First, that conceivability
entails metaphysical possibility, and second, that if we can conceive of a state of affairs,
we can thereby also know that it is metaphysically possible.
This general template is completed in different ways by different variants of the con-
ceivability approach, the most important variable of course being the notion of con-
ceivability. If this notion is left unspecified, we end up with a naive version of the
approach which is at odds with the standard view about metaphysical modality, the
non-epistemic, objective and mind-independent notion of modality which is the main
focus in the epistemology of modality.
According to this view, which has prominently been articulated in Kripke (1980),
there are necessary truths which are not a priori knowable. A well-known example is
the sentence ‘Water is H2O.’ This sentence is taken to express a metaphysical necessity,
since it expresses a true claim about the chemical micro-structure of water and since
natural kinds like water are individuated based on their chemical micro-structure. As a
consequence, a substance with a different micro-structure cannot be water, or in other
words, it is impossible for water to have any other micro-structure. This gives us a clear
constraint on the realm of metaphysical possibilities.
1The term ‘Moorean’ derives from G. E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World.’ See Moore (1993),
chapter 9, p. 166. I have first heard Gideon Rosen apply the term to modal truths.
2See Vaidya (2015) for an overview including a detailed bibliography of recent works.
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It is this constraint which poses a problem for the naive conceivability approach.
According to its first thesis, conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. Without
any qualification of what we mean by conceivability, there is no way to exclude the
conceivable of metaphysically impossible states of affairs, such as that of water being
an element. Given a naive, unqualified notion of conceivability, the conceivability of
a state of affairs does not entail its metaphysical possibility. Conceivers are therefore
are therefore prone to make modal errors, to draw wrong conclusions about the modal
status of states of affairs based on their conceivability. Sophisticated versions of the
conceivability approach accordingly qualify the notion of conceivability in order secure
the entailment between it and metaphysical possibility and to rule out modal errors.3
In this paper, I will focus on a version of the conceivability approach which has so far
not been discussed much in the literature on the epistemology of modality, namely the
correct-conceivability approach described, but not endorsed by Rosen in Rosen (2006).4
The two main aims of this paper are, first, to show that the correct conceivability-
approach faces the objection that correct conceivability is a notion of conceivability in
name only and that it is therefore of no interest to epistemologists of modality. The
second main aim is to argue that the approach may still serve as the basis for an inter-
esting proposal for an epistemology of modality. To pursue this aim, I will point out the
epistemic problems posed by three idealizing assumptions about correct conceivability
made by Rosen and sketch a theory which addresses them.
The remainder of the paper will be structured as follows. In section 2, I will intro-
duce the basic idea of the correct conceivability-approach and introduce and respond
to an objection which one may raise against epistemologies of modality which rely on
knowledge of essence. In section 3, I present an argument which shows that Rosen’s
correct conceivability-based definition of metaphysical possibility is equivalent to a ver-
sion of the essentialist definition of metaphysical necessity. In section 4, I discuss the
epistemic problems introduced by three idealizing assumptions which are needed to run
the equivalence argument. In section 5, I sketch a bifurcated version of the correct
conceivability-approach which addresses these problems. Section 6 is a brief conclusion
which summarizes the arguments of the paper.
3See e.g. Chalmers (2009) or Yablo (1993).
4See also the discussion of the notion of ‘strong coherence’ in Rosen (2002), the precursor-notion to
that of correct conceivability.
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2 Correct Conceivability
2.1 The basic idea
The correct conceivability-approach presupposes the Kripkean standard view of meta-
physical modality and accordingly has to rule out modal errors, cases in which a state
of affairs is conceivable, but not metaphysically possible. How this is done is nicely
explained in the following mock-quote of Rosen’s ‘others’:
‘If the ancients could conceive a world in which water is an element, this is
only because they were ignorant of certain facts about the natures of things.
In particular, it is because they did not know what it is to be water. They
did not know that to be water just is to be a certain compound of hydrogen
and oxygen–that to be a sample of water just is to be a quantity of matter
predominantly composed of molecules of H2O. This is not to say that they
did not understand their word for water. But it’s one thing to understand a
word, another to know the nature of its referent. The ancients could see no
contradiction in the supposition that water is an element because they did
not know that water is a compound by its very nature. But we know this;
and given that we do, we can see that to suppose a world in which water
is an element is to suppose a world in which a substance that is by nature
a compound is not a compound. And that’s absurd.’ (Rosen (2006), pp.
22-23.)
The idea is hence that in order to avoid modal error, conceivability needs to be sup-
plemented by knowledge of the natures, or equivalently, essences of relevant entities, in
this case the essence of (the property of being) water. Equipped with this knowledge,
the conceiver is able to detect that the assumption that water is an element together
with essential truths about the relevant entity entails an absurdity.
The correct conceivability-approach hence gives us a simple and elegant explanation
of why we are apt to make modal errors and a recipe for ruling them out. We tend to
commit modal errors because we can conceive of states of affairs which are ruled out by
relevant essences. To avoid these errors, we have to let our ability to conceive be guided
by knowledge of the essences of relevant entities.
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2.2 An objection to essence-based conceivability approaches and how it can be
addressed
There is a rather obvious objection to the correct conceivability-approach which should
be mentioned: The approach crucially relies the conceiver having knowledge of essence,
but essence itself is a modal notion. Doesn’t this mean that the notion of correct
conceivability cannot answer the core question of modal epistemology, the question of
how we can acquire modal knowledge?
One straigthforward way to respond to this objection is to supplement the correct
conceivability-approach with a matching epistemology of essence,5 but this is not the
only response available. There are at least three further reasons for why we cannot
conclude that the correct conceivability-approach, or more generally any approach which
relies on knowledge of essence fails to address the core question of modal epistemology.
First, a lesson one may draw from Fine (1994)’s influential argument against the
definition of essence in terms of metaphysical necessity is that the notions of metaphysical
necessity and of essence are distinct. As pointed out in section 7 of Vaidya and Wallner
(2019), this metaphysical conclusion leaves open two possibilities: One may either take
essence to be a non-modal notion, or to be a broadly modal notion which is distinct
from other such notions including metaphysical modality. If essence is instead assumed
to be genuinely non-modal, then this suggests that there might also be a substantial
epistemological difference between essence and modality. If there is such a difference,
the objection loses much of its bite since in that case, the epistemologies of essence and
of modality cannot be identified.
Second, even if we grant that essence is a broadly modal notion, the objection pre-
supposes a specific narrow reading of the core question of the epistemology of modality,
the question of how we can acquire modal knowledge. According to this reading, the
core question is understood as asking how we can acquire modal knowledge, given that
we have no prior modal knowledge. There is however a second reading of the core ques-
tion, one according to which it concerns the ways in which a subject can justifiedly pass
from one piece of modal knowledge to another. These two readings give us two distinct
questions which an epistemology of modality has to answer. Epistemologists of modal-
ity usually focus on the first of these two questions, but this does not mean that the
second question is insubstantial or uninteresting.6 One may therefore argue that while
5See for example Lowe (2012), Hale (2013), ch. 11, Tahko (2016), Tahko (2017). For recent critical
discussion of Lowe’s position, see Horvath (2014) and Sgaravatti (2016).
6Vaidya and Wallner (2019) call the first question the access question and distinguish it from the
navigation question, the question of how we can justifiedly pass from knowledge of one kind of
modality, e.g. logical modality, to knowledge of another kind, e.g. metaphysical modality. Their
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the correct conceivability-approach does not answer the first question, it does offer us
an answer to the second question.
Third, one may draw on a distinction drawn at the beginning of the paper to re-
spond to the objection, namely the distinction between the assumption that we can have
knowledge of, in this case, essence, and the question of how we can acquire this sort of
knowledge. The correct conceivability-approach presupposes that we can have knowl-
edge of essential truths. It arguably shares this presupposition with many of the existing
standard positions in the epistemology of modality. As Roca-Royes puts it, ‘at some
level–some times more explicitly than others–they all rely on a capacity for essential-
ist knowledge–arguably an exercised one–in their elucidations of possibility knowledge.’7
Accordingly, the correct conceivability-approach is not worse off in this respect than the
other approaches Roca-Royes alludes to.
Given the availability of epistemologies of essence and based on the these three re-
sponses to the objection, I will here assume that there is room to say something of
substance and interest about an approach to the epistemology of modality which focuses
on the question of how we can have knowledge of modality, given that we have knowledge
of essence.8 For the sake of exploring this kind of approach, I will hence from now on
assume that we can have knowledge of essence, but not discuss the question of how we
can have knowledge of essence. Epistemic questions about how we can have knowledge
of metaphysical modality, given that we have knowledge of essence will take centre stage
in sections 4 and 5 of this paper.
2.3 A preliminary characterization
As a first step towards making the correct conceivability-approach more precise, let me
introduce the following preliminary characterization of the notion:
(CC) A proposition 〈p〉 is correctly conceivable if, and only if, we are not able to derive
an absurdity from 〈p〉 together with propositions expressing the relevant essential
truths.
I call this a preliminary characterization rather than a definition since CC contains
two concepts which need to be further specified, that of absurdity and of a relevant
navigation question is hence more narrow than my second question.
7Roca-Royes (2017), p. 223. This point is argued for in detail in several of her papers (Roca-Royes
(2010), Roca-Royes (2011a), Roca-Royes (2011), Roca-Royes (2012)) and furthermore also in Vaidya
and Wallner (2019).
8There are of course other approaches of this kind in the epistemology of modality. See e.g. Hale
(2013), ch. 11.
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essential truth. More will be said about these two concepts later, but for the moment,
we can already use CC as a stand in for a definition of correct-conceivability in order to
introduce the crucial idea of the correct conceivability-approach:
(CCP) If the state of affairs expressed by a proposition 〈p〉 is correctly conceivable, 〈p〉
expresses a metaphysical possibility.
Together, CC and CCP tell us that if we cannot derive an absurdity from a proposition
together with the relevant essential truths, then that proposition expresses a metaphys-
ical possibility. These two theses need to be supplemented by a third to the effect that
CCP is knowledge conducive, i.e. that if someone can correctly conceive the state of
affairs expressed by 〈p〉, they thereby also know that it is metaphysically possible.
These principles already illustrate an interesting aspect of the correct conceivability-
approach: It deviates from a common pattern exhibited by many approaches in the
epistemology of modality. These approaches are often asymmetric in the sense that
they privilege either the notion of necessity or the notion of possibility as being the
predominant modal status present in our most basic modal knowledge. Those which
rely on knowledge of essence usually privilege necessity, since it is traditionally assumed
to be closely connected to essence. (See Hale (2013), p. 253.) CC and CCP explicitly
rely on knowledge of essence, but nonetheless epistemically privilege possibility.
3 Correct Conceivability and Essential Truth
Why should we accept that correct conceivability entails metaphysical possibility (as
CCP says it does)? In Rosen (2006), the correct-conceivability approach is introduced
as the sufficiency-direction of a definition of metaphysical possibility. This appears to
give us an excellent answer to this question: CC and CCP together give us a sufficient
condition for metaphysical possibility, because that they do is part of an established
definition of the latter notion.
The problem is that it is far from clear-cut whether we can call this definition ‘estab-
lished’. While it is used in Miller (2009) to argue for a version of metaphysical contin-
gentism, it is not accepted by Rosen himself who introduces it as part of a non-standard
conception of metaphysical modality he attributes to his ‘others’. (See Rosen (2006),
section 5, p. 24.) It hence seems that we still have some explaining to do to. In partic-
ular we have to address the following, more specific variant of our initial question: Do
we have a good reason to think that correct conceivability entails genuine metaphysical
possibility, rather than some deviant, non-standard possibility?
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In this section, I will address this question by arguing that the correct conceivability-
based definition of metaphysical possibility is equivalent to a version of the Essentialist
definition of the same notion.9 The Essentialist theory of metaphysical modality, which
has first been proposed by Fine (1994) and then further developed in Correia (2006)
and Correia (2012), has by now established itself as a standard theory of metaphysical
modality.10 The main motivation for the theory is Fine (1994)’s argument against the
modal definition of essentiality.11 Based on four well-known objections, which I will not
discuss here, Fine argues that instead of defining essentiality in terms of necessity, we
should take the latter to be a primitive notion and then use it to define the former. The
core idea of this Essentialist definition of metaphysical necessity is that for a proposition
to express a metaphysical necessity is for it to express an essential truth about some
entities or to follow from a proposition which does. The following is a version of this
definition:
(E) A proposition 〈p〉 is metaphysically necessary if, and only if, there are φφ, such
that B(φφ) ` 〈p〉.12
(E) is a generalized variant of the definitions of metaphysical necessity proposed
in Correia (2012) which is able to accommodate not only objectual, but also generic
essentiality.13 In effect, the definition says that a proposition is metaphysically necessary
if, and only if, it is logically entailed by the essential truths about some objects or
features.
To run the equivalence argument, I will make three further assumptions about the
correct conceivablity-approach which are either explicit or implicit in Rosen (2006).
9A different version of this argument is presented and used for a different purpose in Michels (2019).
10See e.g. Hale (1996), Lowe (2008), Rosen (2010).
11This argument has been very influential, as e.g. pointed out in Roca-Royes (2011b), but has been
criticised recently by a number of authors. See e.g. Correia (2007), Cowling (2013), Denby (2014),
Gorman (2005), Livingstone-Banks (2017), Wildman (2013), Wildman (2016), Zalta (2006).
12To explain the symbols and formalism used: φφ plurally refers to either objects, features, or objects and
features and objects, where ‘feature’ is used as an ontologically neutral term for whatever ontologically
corresponds to predicates (properties or relations, tropes, universals, etc.). For the sake of simplicity,
single objects are treated as (limiting cases of) pluralities. Accordingly, a plural quantification of
the sort involved in E can in principle be satisfied by e.g. the number two, the number two and
the number four, the number two and the feature of being a natural number, the plurality of all
singleton sets, etc. (For more on plural quantification, see Linnebo (2014) or Oliver and Smiley
(2013).) B(φφ) is the basic nature of φφ, which is, following Correia (2012), p. 644 defined as the
plurality of propositions α such that for some sub-plurality ψψ of φφ, α is basically essential to ψψ.
The notion ‘basically essential’ is a primitive notion used to express essentialist claims such as ‘it is
basically essential to the xx that’.
13The need for a notion of generic essence is argued for in Correia (2006) and acknowledged in Fine
(2015).
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First, I will follow Rosen in assuming that the ‘we’ in CC refers to an ideally informed
conceiver (or a group of such conceivers; numbers don’t matter in this context). (See
Rosen (2006), p. 23.) To be ideally informed in this context of course means to be
ideally informed about the relevant essences. The motivation for this first assumption is
to preclude modal errors of non-ideally informed conceivers such as that of the ancients
who didn’t know that being a molecule is essential to being water.
Second, I will assume a trivial reading of ‘relevant’ in CC according to which all
essences are relevant. This second assumption is not explicitly endorsed by Rosen, but
it is required if one wants to accept, as Rosen does, that CCP and its converse together
define an adequate notion of of metaphysical possibility.14
Third, I will follow Rosen (2006), p. 23, footnote 9 in assuming that the ‘to derive an
absurdity’ in CC means ‘to derive a logical contradiction’.
Given the first assumption and the third assumption, we can ‘drop the reference to the
ideal conceiver altogether’ (Rosen (2006), p. 23) from CC, making correct conceivability
simply a matter of derivability of a contradiction from the relevant proposition together
with the relevant essential truths. Given the second and third assumption, if we let
Σ be a plural constant referring to all propositions which express essential truths and
use ` for the notion of logical entailment, ⊥ for a proposition expressing an arbitrary
contradiction, and ∪ for the plural equivalent to set-union,15 we can further specify CC
in the following way:
CC* A proposition 〈p〉 expresses a metaphysical possibility if, and only if, Σ ∪ 〈p〉 6` ⊥.
I will now argue that CC* is extensionally equivalent to (E) by showing that its
right-hand side is equivalent to the right-hand side of the definition of metaphysical
possibility which we get from (E) via the standard assumption that possibility is the
dual of necessity:
(E♦) A proposition p is metaphysically possible if, and only if, there are no φφ, such
that B(φφ) ` ¬p.
14More precisely: According to the informal version of the correct conceivability-based definition, a
proposition expresses a metaphysical possibility, if and only if, it is correctly conceivable, where this
means that we cannot derive an absurdity from the proposition together with the essences. This
definition has to take all essences into account in order to deliver an adequate notion of metaphysical
possibility. If it didn’t, a proposition could turn out to be correctly conceivable given a particular
amount of knowledge of essence, but to not be correctly conceivable given a larger amount. This
would make the notion of metaphysical modality depend on the extent of the conceiver’s knowledge
of essence, violating the standard assumption that this kind of modality is objective and independent
of what we know.
15See Oliver and Smiley (2013), section 12.7 for a definition.
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Which is equivalent to:
(E♦*) A proposition p is metaphysically possible if, and only if, for all φφ, B(φφ) 6` ¬p.
By first applying the standard assumption that 〈p〉 is logically entailed by a set of
propositions ∆ iff 〈¬p〉 is inconsistent with ∆16 to E♦, then replacing 〈¬¬p〉 by 〈p〉
and applying the standard definition of relative consistency, according to which 〈p〉 is
consistent with ∆ iff ∆ ∪ 〈p〉 6` ⊥, we get:
(E♦**) A proposition p is metaphysically possible if, and only if, for all φφ, B(φφ)∪p 6`
⊥.
Since the quantified phrase ‘for all φφ, B(φφ)’ gives us exactly the same plurality of
essential truths as Σ, E♦** is equivalent to CC*.17
The argument shows that the sufficiency direction of CC* is supported by an estab-
lished theory of metaphysical modality, the Essentialist theory developed by Fine and
Correia. More specifically, it is equivalent to the sufficiency direction of the Essentialist
definition of metaphysical possibility E♦. If one accepts this direction of the definition,
one can hence answer the question about the correct conceivability-approach asked at the
beginning of this section: Correct conceivability is sufficient for metaphysical possibility,
because correct conceivability is nothing else than consistency with all essences.18
4 The Epistemic Costs of Securing the Conceivability-Possibility Link. . .
On the one hand, the equivalence argument answers a pressing question about the correct
conceivability-approach, namely why it can rely on the notion of essence in order to
establish that correct conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. On the other hand,
it also casts doubts on the correct conceivability-approach’s viability as a position in the
epistemology of modality.
16More precisely, by applying the equivalent principle that 〈¬p〉 is not logically entailed by ∆ iff 〈¬¬p〉
is consistent with ∆.
17Note that one might think that this equivalence puts the essentialist definition in a bad spot since
CC* is based on a broader theory of metaphysical modality which is explicitly labelled as ‘non-
standard’ in Rosen (2006). This worry is unfounded, since what makes that theory non-standard
is not the correct conceivability-based definition itself, but rather an additional assumption about
essential truths which is also part of the theory, namely the assumption that they are anti-Anselmian
or Kantian. See Rosen (2006), p. 25 and see Michels (2019), section 3.1 for discussion.
18Note that the extensional equivalence between the two definitions is implicitly acknowledged in footnote
10, p. 24 of Rosen (2006) where Rosen states that the Non-Standard conception is inspired by Fine
(1994) and remarks by Fine.
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These doubts manifest themselves as two objections which are directly tied to the
three assumptions needed to run the equivalence argument of the previous section. To
repeat, these assumptions say that when establishing the correct conceivability of the
state of affairs expressed by a proposition 〈p〉:
Idealization . . . the subject who is able to deduce an absurdity from 〈p〉 together with the
proposition expressing the relevant essential truths is an ideally informed conceiver.
Trivial Relevance . . . the essences of all entities (i.e. of both objects and features) are
relevant.
Absurdity as Contradiction . . . ‘absurdity’ means nothing else than ‘logical contradic-
tion’.
The general problem with these assumptions is that they interfere with the second
main thesis of the correct conceivability-approach, which says that if one is able to
correctly conceive a state of affairs, one also knows that it is metaphysically possible.
The first objection is based on the fact that given the three assumptions, both the
notions of a conceiver and of conceivability can be completely eliminated from the correct
conceivability-approach: The equivalence argument shows that they can be replaced
by the notion of consistency with the essences. In other words, the first objection
says that correct conceivability is a notion of conceivability only in name and that the
correct conceivability-approach hence does not even qualify as a candidate position in
the epistemology of (metaphysical) modality. To address this objection, I will argue that
both conceivers and the notion of conceivability have a substantive role to play in the
correct conceivability-approach. This will be the task of the first subsection of the next
section.
The second objection arises even if one grants both that there is a role to play for
conceivers and for the notion of conceivability in the correct conceivability-approach and
that we can in principle have knowledge of essence. It says Trivial Relevance makes it
impossible for us to have knowledge of what is correctly conceivable, because we can
plausibly never know the essences of all entities. The objection hence targets the correct
conceivability-approach at its very foundation. I will argue in the second subsection
of the next section that this objection can be addressed by adopting a metaphysical
assumption about essential truths.
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5 . . . And How They Might Be Avoided
5.1 A role to play for conceivers and conceivability
The response to the first objection which I will give in this subsection is based on two
ideas. The first idea is to grant the point that the idealized notion of correct conceiv-
ability is not by itself fit to play the role it should play according to the second main
thesis. As we have seen in section 3, given the three assumptions, correct conceivability
boils down to consistency with the essences. Given Idealization and of course assuming
the correct conceivability-approach, this seems acceptable, assuming that there are no
fundamental boundaries to knowledge of essence which are impenetrable even for an
ideally informed epistemic agent. This means on the one hand that we keep the second
main thesis of the correct conceivability approach intact. On the other hand, however it
also means that this thesis appears to be irrelevant to regular, non-ideal conceivers like
ourselves.
The second idea is that the entailment from correct conceivability to metaphysical
possibility nonetheless has a use for non-ideal conceivers: We are not and cannot be-
come ideally informed conceivers, but we can still be competent non-ideally informed
conceivers. I will shorty explain what I mean by that, but let me first point out that the
correct conceivability-approach is not the only epistemology of modality which involves a
condition like Idealization. The possibility-entailing notion of conceivablity in Chalmers
(2002) for example is also idealized in the sense that the underlying ability is only avail-
able to idealized epistemic agents. The response which I will now propose might for this
reason also relevant to other conceivability-approaches which rely on idealized epistemic
agents.
An ideally informed conceiver is just a regular conceiver stripped of some relevant limi-
tations of regular conceivers regarding the information they may have. Since the relevant
information in this case is known information about essences, the relevant limitation is
that of having incomplete knowledge of essence. This limitation has two dimensions.
First, it might concern what one might call basic knowledge of the essences proper of
the relevant entities, i.e. their essential properties. The ancients mentioned in Rosen’s
quote from section 2 were lead into modal error since they lacked basic knowledge of the
essence of (the property of being) water.
Second, it might also concern derived knowledge of essences. It could for example be
claimed that we are collectively limited in our knowledge of the essences of integers, since
we don’t have a proof or disproof of Goldbach’s conjecture, and this might be true even
if we had all relevant basic knowledge of their essences. The Mathematicians working
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on the topic might just not have found the right path through what the axioms which
capture these essences entail.19
An ideally informed conceiver has complete basic and derived knowledge of essence. As
the modifier ‘complete’ suggests, knowledge of essence comes in degrees. Even though
we ourselves can plausibly not become idealized conceivers, we can, presupposing of
course that we can in general have knowledge of essence, have some basic knowledge
and some derived knowledge of the relevant essences. In other words, we can have some
degree of knowledge of essence and correspondingly some knowledge of what is correctly
conceivable.
While I do not want to commit myself here to a particular general epistemology of
essence, it might be useful to use one proposal for such an epistemology to illustrate
this point. Following Hale we might (for the sake of illustration) assume that there
are ‘cases in which knowledge of meaning suffices for knowledge of essence[, cases] in
which we are able to give an explicit definition of a word (or an explicit analysis of the
corresponding concept).’ (Hale (2013), p. 255.) Accordingly, we might say that we have
basic knowledge of the essence of triangularity (or of the property of being triangular), if
we know the explicit definition of being triangular, i.e. if we know that to be triangular
is to have the shape of a polygon with three edges and three vertices. We might also
have some derived knowledge of its essence, e.g. by knowing that the definition entails
the isosceles triangle theorem, but we might lack other derived knowledge of its essence,
e.g. that the definition entails the Pythagorean theorem. The geometrically non-ideally
informed conceiver in this example would be in a position to rule out the metaphysical
possibility of there being an isosceles triangle with unequal angles opposite its equal
sides, but not in a position to rule out the metaphysical possibility of there being a right
triangle which is such that the square of the length of its hypothenuse is unequal to the
sum of the squares of the lengths of its two other sides.20
The point of the example is to illustrate that while only an ideally informed conceiver
has the basic and derived knowledge of essence needed to be able to correctly conceive
all that is available to be correctly conceived, non-ideally informed conceivers can still
have the more limited ability to correctly conceive some states of affairs. The more
general point of my response to the first objection is hence that while genuine correct
conceivability, correct conceivability of the highest degree, is indeed beyond our epistemic
19The distinction between basic and derived knowledge of essence of course parallels Fine (1995b)’s
distinction between constitutive and consequential essence.
20Note that Hale’s theory also extends to knowledge of essential truths about material objects and that
the corresponding part of his theory relies on a different methodology, involving Kripkean principles
of how we can gain knowledge of a posteriori necessities.
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grasp, there is some overlap between what we can conceive of as non-ideal conceivers and
what is ideally conceivable. Accordingly, we can approximate correct conceivability to
some degree. The difference between full correct conceivability and this approximation
is a difference regarding how much (basic and derived) knowledge about the relevant
essences ideal correct conceivers can have compared to us mere non-ideal conceivers.
The amount of knowledge of essence is not the only thing which matters when it comes
to approximating (ideal) correct conceivability. To be able to approximate an ideal
conceiver regarding the correct conceivability of a state of affairs, a non-ideal conceiver
also needs to have knowledge of the right essences in the first place. More precisely, in
order to be able to know whether the state of affairs expressed by a proposition 〈p〉 is
correctly conceivable, one needs to know all essential truths relevant to 〈p〉. To generalize
this idea, we can call a non-idealized conceiver C competent regarding a set of ideally
conceivable states of affairs, if, with respect to the propositions expressing these states of
affairs, a) C’s ability to conceive perfectly aligns with that of an ideal conceiver and b)
C is able to draw the relevant logical conclusions from what C can (correctly) conceive.
Taking the distinction between basic and derived knowledge of essence into account, we
can say that those conceivers are competent with respect to a set of propositions ∆ who
have all the relevant basic and derived knowledge of essence on which an ideal conceiver
would rely on in order to check whether an absurdity is derivable given both ∆ and the
propositions which capture the relevant knowledge of essence.
The general idea underlying this response is to reconstruct the correct conceivability-
approach as a bifurcated view. First, it involves the idealized notion of correct con-
ceivability which supports its instance of the first main thesis of the conceivability-
approach, the thesis that correct conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. Second,
it involves the non-idealized, sets-of-propositions-relativized notion of competent con-
ceivability, which partly approximates the idealized notion and which in virtue of this
fact is also metaphysical possibility-entailing, as far as it reaches.
Pace Rosen’s remark that ‘[t]he ideally informed conceiver is simply an infallible de-
tector of latent absurdity’ (Rosen (2006), p. 23.), regular, non-idealized conceivers, and
thereby also the regular notion of conceivability, have an important role to play within
the bifurcated version of the correct conceivability-approach. They can acquire compe-
tency regarding sets of propositions, e.g. those about certain mathematical entities or
structures. This means that the notion of correct conceivability, in its partial form as
exercised by competent conceivers, can be used to support the second main thesis of the
conceivability approach: We can know whether 〈p〉 expresses a metaphysical possibility
byby being competent conceivers regarding the class of propositions relevant to the the
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state of affairs expressed by 〈p〉.
It is important to note that the correct conceivability-approach so conceived does not
require competent conceivers to know that they are competent regarding the class of
propositions, or so to say, the topic, relevant to their field of competency. Rather it is
enough for them to be able to correctly conceive of the corresponding states of affairs.
This requirement would be problematic, since if it were part of the correct conceivability-
approach, then in order to be a competent conceiver, one would have to know that the
truths about a particular topic which one knows are correctly conceivable, leading to
an epistemic circularity. In this respect, the correct conceivability-approach resembles
externalist approaches in epistemology.21
5.2 Trivial Relevance
In the previous subsection, I have suggested a bifurcated version of the correct conceivability-
approach in which the notion of conceivability has a substantial role to play. The second
objection threatens the approach in general, but also this particular version of it. It
says that we are unable to rely on correct conceivability in order to gain knowledge of
metaphysical possibilities, because this would require us to have knowledge of all the
essences. The underlying thought is that in order to be able to correctly conceive of a
state of affairs expressed by a proposition 〈p〉 that it is correctly conceivable, we have to
be able to ascertain that there is no proposition expressing an essential truth about some
entity or entities which entails the falsity of 〈p〉. The only way to exclude the existence
of such undermining essential truths is to take absolutely all potential underminers, i.e.
absolutely all essentially true propositions, into account. The assumption driving this
objection is of course Trivial Relevance, the assumption that all essences are relevant to
the correct conceivability of any proposition.
Fine’s Essentialist framework offers a way to motivate this objection: In it, the canon-
ical way to express claims about essences involves the primitive notion ‘true in virtue
of the nature of’, which is represented by the indexed sentential operator ‘F ’ in Fine’s
formal work on the logic of essence (Fine (1995a), Fine (2000)). Formally, claims about
essence take the form ‘F p’. Sentences of this form say that p is true in virtue of the
nature of F , where F is a rigid predicate, a predicate which need not be meaningful and
merely serves to rigidly pick out a particular plurality of objects. Since Fine places no
syntactical restriction on the combination of a rigid predicate and a sentential variable
involved in a sentence involving this indexed operator, it de facto allows for essentialist
21See e.g. Steup (2017), section 2.3.
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claims in which a propositions is said to express an essential truth about and object
which is not involved in that proposition. Te objector might argue that since Fine’s
framework in principle allows us to express claims of the form which undermining essen-
tial truths would have to take, someone who accepts the correct conceivability-approach
and works within the Finean framework has to accept Trivial Relevance to exclude them.
Given the distinction between the idealized and the approximative non-idealized no-
tion of conceivability, we can distinguish two versions of the second objection. The first,
which aims at the (idealized) notion of correct conceivability is an obvious non-starter,
since we can safely assume that unlike us, ideally informed conceivers are capable of
(both basically and derivedly) knowing the essences of all objects whatsoever. The sec-
ond, more pertinent version aims at the notion of someone’s being a competent conceiver
regarding a particular topic. The idea is that in order to be a competent conceiver with
respect to e.g. certain propositions about a particular artifact, we need not only be able
to know the essence of that artifact, but also the essences of all other entities. As a
result, competent conceivability is, the objection claims, just as unattainable for us as
is full correct conceivability. This version of the objection hence poses a serious threat
to the correct conceivability-approach as developed so far in this paper.
In the following I will argue that the objection can be addressed by adopting a meta-
physical assumption about which essences are relevant to the essential truth of a propo-
sition. The assumption is the following:
Internality The only essences relevant to the essential truth (or essential falsity) of a
proposition are the essences of the entities involved in the proposition.
By entities, I here mean anything which can have an essence. In a broadly Finean
framework, these are in particular objects, concepts, and features (i.e. whatever ontolog-
ically corresponds to predicates). The entities involved in a proposition are those which
the proposition is about, either directly or indirectly. To give an example, the proposi-
tion 〈Socrates is human〉 is directly about Socrates and indirectly about (the property
of) being human. I will shortly say a bit more about the notion of involvement.
Why does accepting Internality help addressing the second objection? Because the
essences which are relevant to the truth or, more importantly in the context of the
correct conceivability-approach, falsity of a proposition are at the same time also the
essences which could, combined with the proposition, yield a contradiction. Internality
hence ensures that competent conceivers only need to consider, and for that matter also
need to only have knowledge of, the essences of the entities involved in the propositions
which they test for consistency with the essences.
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In light of what I have previously said about the Finean framework, Iternality might
seem like a very strong and potentially problematic assumption. This is of course a
very vague worry, unless one can give concrete examples of cases in which Internality is
violated. Here is an attempt at doing just that. Assume that the commonly discussed
claim that humans essentially originate from their biological parents is true. Based on
this (rather controversialm, one has to say22) claim, one might for example argue that the
proposition 〈Phaenarete is a mother〉 expresses an essential truth about Socrates, since
it is essential to him that she is his mother and since the latter proposition entails that
she is a mother.23 At first sight, this appears to give us a counterexample to Internality,
since the essence of Socrates is clearly relevant to the truth of the proposition, but
Internality tells us that this is not so, since the proposition is not directly or indirectly
about Socrates.
This purported counterexample arises only if one presupposes a strict reading of the
notion of involvement which reads involvement off the syntactic form of the proposition.
According to this reading, the only entities (objects, properties, or relations) involved in
a proposition are those represented by its syntactic components. If we assume a Rus-
sellian theory of propositions,24 the strict reading just says that only the entities which
are contained in the proposition, in whichever way entities are contained in Russellian
propositions, are involved in the proposition. But this reading is not mandatory. A
proponent of the correct conceivability-approach can adopt a more relaxed reading of
the notion which also allows that objects which are relevant to the truth or falsity of the
proposition can be said to be involved in it.
One way of fleshing this out is to rely on the truthmakers of propositions and to say
that the entitites involved in the truthmakers of a propositions can be said to be indi-
rectly involved in that proposition. In case of the proposition 〈Phaenarete is a mother〉
this plays out as follows: This proposition has the logical form ∃x(Phaenarete is the
mother of x). This means that it is logically entailed by a proposition which directly
involves Socrates, namely the proposition 〈Phaenarete is Socrates’s mother〉. That sec-
ond proposition has a fact involving Socrates as its truthmaker and by the assumption
that any propositions which is logically entailed by another shares that proposition’s
truthmakers, it follows that 〈Phaenarete is a mother〉 has a truthmaker which involved
Socrates. So Socrates can be said to be indirectly involved in the proposition and ac-
22See e.g. the discussion in Ballarin (2013), Robertson (1998), Roca-Royes and Cameron (2006),
Rohrbaugh and deRosset (2004), Rohrbaugh and deRosset (2006).
23Note that the proposition would in this case describe what one can, following Fine (1995b), call the
consequential essence of Socrates.
24See e.g. King (2017) for an introduction to this theory of propositions.
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cordingly, we can say that it does not give us a counterexample to Internality.
The discussion of this purported counterexample illustrates a general strategy for
addressing counterexamples to Internality, namely that of adopting a suitable notion
of involvement in a proposition. In deploying this strategy, proponents of the correct
conceivability-approach of course have to stay clear of at least one pitfall, namely that
of adopting a trivial notion of involvement, according to which any object is involved in
any proposition. But this seems to be no major hurdle. A trivial notion of this sort has
to be avoided for independent reasons anyway, unless one wants to accept an extreme
holism concerning what propositions expressing essential truths express essential truths
about.
There is a second, more general worry one might have about Internality. The worry
is that it seems problematic in general to rely on a metaphysical assumption such as
Internality in order to address an objection to an epistemic theory.
In response, I want to first point out that this worry is based on an unrealistic view
about what one might call the metaphysical purity of epistemic theories. The widely-
discussed safety-condition for knowledge (see e.g. Pritchard (2007)) for example says
that a belief cannot qualify as knowledge unless in all close possible worlds in which the
subject which has the belief in the actual world continues to form the same belief about
the relevant proposition in the same way, the belief continues to be true. (See Pritchard
(2007), section 3.) Safety conditions along these lines are clearly not metaphysically pure
in the envisaged, exaggerated sense, since they state conditions on the truth of certain
propositions throughout certain possible worlds.
Second, it might be argued that this worry only presents a real problem for the cor-
rect conceivability-approach if Internality fails to be independently motivated. From a
metaphysical point of view, one motivation for Internality is that it helps rule out what
one might call cases of extraneous essential truths, cases in which a proposition which
involves some entities expresses an essential true about some other entities, even though
the former and the latter do not essentially stand in any relations. Fine (1995b), espe-
cially in section 4 goes to some lengths in order to rule out cases of this sort,25 so this
motivation appears to fit a version of the correct conceivability-approach which relies on
Fine’s Essentialist framework quite well.
25See Koslicki (2012) for discussion.
18
6 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was an argument for the extensional equivalence between
the correct-conceivability-based definition of metaphysical possibility and the Essential-
ist definition of the same notion. This argument on the one hand supports the idea
that correct conceivability is indeed sufficient for metaphysical possibility, but on the
other appears to undermine the epistemic usefulness of the notion of correct conceiv-
ability. This is so because the argument involves three idealizing assumptions which
have epistemically problematic implication about the second crucial claim of the cor-
rect conceivability-approach, the claim that we can have knowledge of the metaphysical
possibility of states of affairs via our ability to correctly conceive of them. In the last
two briefly sketched a bifurcated version of the approach in which the idealized notion
of correct conceivability is supplemented by a proposition-relativized notion of being a
competent conceiver. I cannot claim to have developed a fully worked out version of
this view in the paper, but I hope to have at least made it plausible that the notion of
correct conceivability may have a role to play in the epistemology of modality.26
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